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ABSTRACT According to the Eurobarometer report about EU media use of May 2018, the
number of European citizens who consult on-line social networks for accessing information is
considerably increasing. In this work we analyse approximately 106 tweets exchanged during
the last Italian elections held on March 4, 2018. Using an entropy-based null model dis-
counting the activity of the users, we ﬁrst identify potential political alliances within the group
of veriﬁed accounts: if two veriﬁed users are retweeted more than expected by the non-
veriﬁed ones, they are likely to be related. Then, we derive the users’ afﬁliation to a coalition
measuring the polarisation of unveriﬁed accounts. Finally, we study the bipartite directed
representation of the tweets and retweets network, in which tweets and users are collected
on the two layers. Users with the highest out-degree identify the most popular ones, whereas
highest out-degree posts are the most “viral”. We identify signiﬁcant content spreaders with
a procedure that allows to statistically validate the connections that cannot be explained by
users’ tweeting activity and posts’ virality, using an entropy-based null model as benchmark.
The analysis of the directed network of validated retweets reveals signals of the alliances
formed after the elections, highlighting commonalities of interests before the event of the
national elections.
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Introduction
In recent years, the computer revolution we are witnessingmade evident that the interconnection between individuals inthe society formed a (non regular) lattice on which news and
gossips propagate from one person to another one (Barabási,
2011). Indeed, the way Europeans approach news and informa-
tion has drastically changed. According to the Eurobarometer
report about EU media use of May 2018 (TNS opinion social and
Directorate-General Communications, 2018), printed press is
consulted everyday by 28% of the EU citizens, following a
decreasing trend, while is never consulted by approximately 20%
of them. On the other hand, the daily access to the Internet
increased up to 65% of the population (starting from a 45% in
2010) and the increase in the percentage of citizens using daily
on-line social network for accessing information is even more
striking, changing from 18% in 2010 to 42% in 2017. This
movement towards new technologies is especially true for Italy:
according to the report (AGCOM, 2018) the Italians’ most con-
sulted medium to gather information in 2017 is the TV, followed
by the Internet, the radio and the newspapers (respectively, 68.8,
41.8, 24.6% and 17.3% of the population daily access these
channels). Despite the informative power of the on-line sources
seems to be growing, it is paradoxically in opposition to a general
distrust towards new media: in Italy of 2017, the Internet
(intended as on-line social networks, blogs, news portals, on-line
newspapers websites, etc.) is perceived as the less reliable infor-
mation source, while TV is seen as broadcasting the most trust-
worthy news.
The different ways people access and consume information
have always been a topic of interest for the social sciences espe-
cially during electoral events, when the research is focused on the
identiﬁcation of the determinants of citizens’ political preferences.
Preliminary works (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Katz and Lazarsfeld,
1955; Berelson et al., 1954) were fundamental in understanding
how one’s political choice is affected by interpersonal networks of
different nature (such as friendship, colleagues, family). This idea
is even more relevant nowadays, when the citizen’s opinion is not
only related to her/his real-life social sphere but also to the virtual
circle of connections, who express their beliefs on different social
platforms. Therefore, also in more recent years, different analyses
based on complex network theory (Newman, 2010; Caldarelli,
2010) have been undertaken in order to tackle different aspects of
these phenomena.
Due to their increasing popularity and usage for accessing
information, several studies are based on the analysis of on-line
users’ behaviour in conjunction with political events, such as: the
raising of grass-root democratic protests as Arab springs (Gon-
zález-Bailón et al., 2011), Occupy Wall Street (Conover et al.,
2011) or the Spanish “Indignados” (González-Bailón et al., 2013);
the electoral campaign itself, that has been focused time by time
on USA (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Diakopoulos and Shamma,
2010; DiGrazia et al., 2013; Bekaﬁgo and McBride, 2013; Badawy
et al., 2018; Bovet et al., 2018; Bovet and Makse, 2018), Australia
(Gibson and McAllister, 2006; Bruns and Stieglitz, 2012), Norway
(Enli and Skogerbø, 2013), Spain (Borondo et al., 2012; Stella
et al., 2018b), Italy (Caldarelli et al., 2014; Del Vicario et al.,
2017a; Bindi et al., 2018; Stella et al., 2018a), France (Ferrara,
2017) and UK (Cram et al., 2017; Del Vicario et al., 2017b).
One of the consequences of the use of the Internet and on-line
social networks for accessing information is a general shift from
mediated to disintermediated news consumption, because of the
fact that also sources that are unrelated to the standard infor-
mation channels can participate to news spreading (AGCOM,
2018). This fact has led to a range of documented phenomena:
users tend to focus on information reinforcing their opinion
(conﬁrmation bias (Quattrociocchi et al., 2014; Del Vicario et al.,
2016b, 2016a; Schmidt et al., 2018a, 2018b) and to group in
clusters of people with similar viewpoints, forming the so called
echo chambers, a phenomenon that is largely studied in on-line
settings (Bakshy et al., 2015; Nikolov et al., 2015; Del Vicario et al.
2016b, 2016a; Schmidt et al., 2018a, 2018b) but that also have
conspicuous repercussions ofﬂine (Hampton et al., 2017; Di
Fonzo, 2011). Remarkably, even if it is becoming of public interest
due to the diffusion of the political debate in on-line social media,
the reinforcement of personal opinion due to the inﬂuence of
reference groups was already analysed in previous studies (Osh-
agan, 1996; Moy et al., 2001). The different dynamics that the
public debate follows on social-network platforms is also
remarkable: the time evolution of viral non-veriﬁed contents is
more persistent than the veriﬁed equivalent (Del Vicario et al.,
2016a) and “negative" messages spread faster than “positive" ones,
even if the latter reach on average a wider audience (Ferrara and
Yang, 2015). Moreover, the analysis of time evolution of the
activities in social platforms helps to predict the trend of retweets
(Kobayashi and Lambiotte, 2016), the interactions of a single user
with her/his neighbours (Tabourier et al., 2016) and to detect
future developments of information campaign at an early stage
(Varol et al., 2017) or “astroturf” campaigns (Ferrara, 2017).
The analysis of users’ on-line behaviour during political event
is the major topic of the present work too. However, we observe
that the study of on-line social networks is often complicated by
their complex, intertwined organisation and their strong hetero-
geneity. Therefore, with respect to the previous literature we
approach this topic on a different manner, relying on carefully
constructed null models to identify the network’s salient features
as signiﬁcant deviations from them. An unbiased entropy-based
null-model can be obtained following the information theory
derivation of statistical physics (Jaynes, 1957; Squartini Tiziano
and Garlaschelli Diego, 2017; Cimini et al., 2018): starting from
an observed network, deﬁne an ensemble comprehending all
possible networks with the same amount of nodes1 but variable
number of links, passing from an empty network to the fully
connected one, via all possible link conﬁgurations. Then deﬁne a
probability distribution over the ensemble: the shape of this
distribution can be derived through the entropy maximisation
under certain constraints (Park and Newman, 2004), i.e., pre-
serving the average values over the ensemble of some quantities of
interest. In order to obtain an estimate for the probability dis-
tribution parameters, we maximise the likelihood to observe the
real network (Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2008; Squartini and
Garlaschelli, 2011). The crucial point of the above construction is
the role of the constraints: in order to provide a reliable null-
model, constraints should represent important properties of the
system under analysis. Depending on the application, they may
represent either the total number of links, as in the Erdös-Rényi
model, or the degree sequence as in (Park and Newman, 2004;
Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2008; Squartini and Garlaschelli, 2011),
or other topological properties (Squartini et al., 2013; Fronczak
et al., 2013; Mastrandrea et al., 2014; Di Gangi et al., 2018; Becatti
et al., 2019; de Jeude et al., 2018).
We rely on this literature in order to properly analyse ~106
tweets exchanged during the last Italian elections held on March
4, 2018. First we employ an undirected representation of the
network of retweets by distinguishing certiﬁed from non-certiﬁed
users. Then we identify groups of veriﬁed users by their inter-
action with the opposite layer, following the recipe of (Gualdi
et al., 2016; Saracco et al., 2017): if two veriﬁed users are
retweeted more than expected by the non-veriﬁed ones, they are
likely to be related. Then, we analyse the community organisation
of the resulting network and measure the polarisation of unver-
iﬁed users according to this division: as observed in other studies
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(Dandekar et al., 2012; Flaxman et al., 2013; Bakshy et al., 2015;
Nikolov et al., 2015; Quattrociocchi et al., 2014; Del Vicario et al.,
2016b, 2016a; Schmidt et al., 2018a, 2018b), people tend to
interact just with a single community, strongly polarising their
opinions and we conﬁrm this observation in the Italian elections
of 2018. Finally, we study a bipartite and directed representation
of the users’ tweets and retweets network, in order to identify
signiﬁcant news consumers. In order to do so, we statistically
validate the (directed) connections that cannot be simply
explained by the “virality" of the tweets and the tweet/retweet
activity of the users. This last validation is an extension of the
approach of (Gualdi et al., 2016; Saracco et al. 2017) to direct
bipartite networks.
Our analysis uncovers the various strategies for the electoral
campaign, followed by different political alliances and highlights a
different participation to the political debate, providing indica-
tions about the role of the in spreading viral content inside each
community. Moreover, we observe not only the alliances pre-
sented before the election, but even a signal of the alliances after
the elections. Indeed, our studies show the proximity of the
electorate of the governing parties during the debate, despite
belonging to different pre-elections alliances.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section
‘Results’ we describe the performed analyses with a report of the
main ﬁndings; we summarise research questions, results and this
work’s contribution in the Section ‘Discussion’. More detailed
information regarding the dataset, the analyses and methods can
be found in Section ‘Methods’ and in the Supplementary
Material ﬁle.
Results
By means of the Python module tweepy we have used the
Twitter Search API to download a sample of all tweets posted
from January 28 to March 19, 2018. This tool has been adopted
conscious of the fact that the scientiﬁc literature has largely
investigated the problems related to sampling procedures in on-
line social networks (Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Morstatter et al.,
2013; Pfeffer et al., 2018), especially during political events as in
(González-Bailón et al., 2014), and the difference with the alter-
native tool of the Streaming API, as in (Driscoll and Walker,
2014). The query has been performed only requiring each post to
contain at least one of a set of Italian elections-related keywords,
such as elezioni, elezioni2018, 4marzo, 4marzo2018 (meaning
elections, elections 2018, 4 march, 4 march 2018, respectively). It
is worth noting that the API works in such a way that it returns a
sample of the available tweets for each query, therefore the
authors had no role in the selection of the tweets used for the
analyses. For additional details regarding the nature of the data-
set, refer to the Supplementary Material ﬁle, Section
‘Introduction’.
The analysis conducted throughout the paper revolves around
two main research questions: (1) Is it possible to infer the
polarisation (i.e., the membership to a certain political wing) of
an user from her/his relational activity instead of the textual
information of her/his posts? (2) Once we detrend for the activity
of users and the virality of the tweets, what can be said about the
structure of the social network?
The former question is motivated by the intuition that social
interactions of an user reveal her/his adherence to certain opi-
nions. The second question is methodological: the analysis of a
complex system is usually complicated by the presence of dif-
ferent types of noise covering the relevant information. Here, our
purpose is to uncover the traits of the phenomenon that cannot
be simply explained by the activity of the nodes in the system. A
natural framework to address this challenge is an entropy-based
approach, which (by construction) provides an unbiased frame-
work for the analysis of real networks (Squartini Tiziano and
Garlaschelli Diego, 2017; Cimini et al., 2018).
In the following sections we address such questions. More
speciﬁcally, Sections ‘Identiﬁcation of alliances via unveriﬁed user
behaviours’, ‘Structure of the communities’, ‘Polarisation analysis’
deal with the ﬁrst question, while Section ‘Inﬂuence analysis’
investigates the second one.
Identiﬁcation of alliances via unveriﬁed user behaviours. As a
ﬁrst step, we have split the sample of Italian-speaking users into
two groups, the veriﬁed and non-veriﬁed users. This variable is
directly available from the API and characterises those users that
have requested to be authenticated by the system. Therefore the
distinction between the two types is actually made by the users
themselves, since in principle any account can request to be
veriﬁed: when it does, Twitter guarantees that the account is
authentic. For this reason, we expect this procedure to be mostly
applied to those people considered of public interest, such as
actors, politicians, newspapers, TV channels, radio channels etc.
After this distinction, we build the bipartite network of retweets
between veriﬁed and non-veriﬁed users: an edge between two
users indicates that one has retweeted the other’s content at least
once during the available time period. At this step we disregard
edges’ direction, therefore in principle we do not know who is the
author of the post and who is the second one who shares the
content. However, as shown in Fig. 4 of the Supplementary
Material ﬁle, the actions of tweeting and sharing contents are
mostly performed by veriﬁed accounts, while non-veriﬁed users
mainly retweet already published posts.
In order to obtain groups of veriﬁed users based on their
activity, we project the information contained in this bipartite
network on the veriﬁed users layer. The result of the classical
projection methods is a weighted monopartite network: two users
are connected if they share at least one common neighbour on the
opposite layer and the edge between them is weighted by the
number of non-veriﬁed users who have simultaneously retweeted
their posts. However, this method often generates a very dense
projection; thus, several procedures have been proposed in order
to establish the signiﬁcance of the edges in the projected network,
discounting different pieces of information. For this application
we use as benchmark an entropy-based null model that discounts
the information contained in the degree sequence of both layers
(Saracco et al., 2017); in this way we are focusing on overlaps that
cannot be explained by the activity of the users only. A brief
description of this approach can be found in Section ‘Methods’,
but refer to the Supplementary Material for the details of the
entire procedure.
Given the projected and validated network of retweets, we have
performed a reshufﬂed community detection procedure, i.e., the
Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al., 2008) runs several times with a
rearranged nodes’ ordering and the partition with the highest
modularity is selected: by doing so we overcome the original
algorithm’s order dependence (Fortunato, 2010). With this
procedure we identify ten groups of non-isolated nodes. However,
for the following analyses we only focus on a subset of four of
them, being those with a remarkable number of nodes (more than
a hundred) and a non-trivial interpretation. Two blocks identify
quite well the groups of Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S hereafter) and
right-leaning politicians. For instance, in the former we ﬁnd the
accounts M5S Camera, M5S Senato, M5S Europa and Movimento
5 Stelle, as well as the politicians Danilo Toninelli or Luigi Di
Maio. Instead in the latter we see the accounts Forza Italia, Lega -
Salvini Premier, Gruppo FI Camera, Fratelli d’Italia, Noi con
Salvini, as well as the users Silvio Berlusconi, Matteo Salvini,
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Renato Brunetta or Giorgia Meloni. The two remaining
communities are instead more heterogeneous. In one of them,
we ﬁnd a high number of radios, newspapers or newscasts, such
as Rai Radio 2, Radio 105, RTL 102.5, Tg Rai, Tg La7, Sky Tg 24,
Rai News, la Repubblica, Il Corriere della Sera, Il Post. Since the
majority of nodes refers to ofﬁcial accounts of news media, we
characterise this group as the one collecting news spreaders and
information channels. Finally, the last community encompasses
some politicians within the left-leaning parties, such as Matteo
Renzi and some other ﬁgures belonging to the Democratic party
(included the account of the Partito Democratico itself). There-
fore we use this interpretation for the last detected community.
Structure of the communities. Given the division in political
alliances, we start analysing the topological characteristics of the
subgraphs made by each group. In order to facilitate the under-
standing, we represent each community with a colour reminiscent
of the colour used during the elections to represent the coalitions.
We display the political coalitions (i.e., M5S, left-leaning and
right-leaning alliances), respectively, in yellow, red and blue,
while we use purple for the information channels community.
This choice of colours will be used consistently throughout this
manuscript.
In the present section we focus our analysis on some features of
these identiﬁed clusters. Since the communities’ average shortest-
path-length are smaller or comparable to the values observed in
the entire validated network, we suppose the presence of central
users that behave as “bridges” between different communities in
the process of news spreading. Table 1 provides a list of the ﬁrst
ﬁfty most central users in the validated network of retweets,
together with their afﬁliation with respect to the four identiﬁed
groups. The ﬁrst positions are covered by medias and journalists,
the majority of which are afﬁliated with the purple community.
However, we also observe users from the other communities, such
as Il Fatto Quotidiano or Peter Gomez and IlSole24ORE.
Another important insight on users’ behaviour comes from the
observation of the hashtags used by the veriﬁed users. Excluding
the set of keywords used to extract the data, Fig. 1 reproduces the
hashtags used more frequently by the veriﬁed users of each
community, selecting those with a frequency higher than or equal
to the 0.5% of the total number of hashtags in the single
community. All political (i.e., yellow, red and blue) communities
have the name of their own party as the most mentioned tag: we
observe, respectively, the hashtags “m5s”, “pd" and “centrodestra”
in their ﬁrst position. Nevertheless, the second most used hashtag
refers to the main opponent of the political alliance represented
by the community. It is curious that this word is the Movimento 5
Stelle for both the right-leaning and left-leaning alliances, since it
was effectively the most voted party at the elections. Instead, the
second most used hashtag by Movimento 5 Stelle is “renzi", leader
of the Partito Democratico at the moment of the elections,
governing at that time. Also the major exponents of the other
parties are mentioned, for instance “berlusconi”, “salvini” and
“dimaio” appear in the left-leaning and right-leaning parties, as
well as in the M5S one and the mixed group. Even if the
frequencies of the hashtags are comparable, all alliances have the
name of their own coalition as the most frequent one, followed by
the names of the major competitors. In three of the communities
we also observe the tag “maratonamentana” as one of the most
frequently used. This is the name of a TV show that is extremely
popular during the elections, since it broadcasts live the scrutiny
after the election day. This year it became even more viral, since
the show was transmitted for almost 12 h without any interrup-
tion by the same anchor-man and started again after just 3 h of
break. In the Supplementary Material ﬁle we graphically represent
another interesting behaviour regarding the use of tags, that will
be better discussed in the following Sections.
Polarisation analysis. Once identiﬁed four groups of political
actors and information channels representing the Italian political
scenario, we proceed with the analysis of how the remaining
accounts interact with them. In other words, the goal is to study
whether the audience is polarised towards the source of infor-
mation that better resembles their ideology or uniformly shares
contents from accounts of different political orientation.
Following the notation introduced in the Supplementary
Material ﬁle, we indicate with L and Γ, respectively, the sets of
veriﬁed and unveriﬁed users collected in the two layers of the
corresponding network, while we denote with Cc for c= 1, 2, 3, 4
the division in communities identiﬁed at the end of the phase
above, denoting, respectively, the veriﬁed users belonging to M5S,
information channels community, the left-leaning and right-
leaning accounts. Also indicate with
N α ¼ fi : i 2 L andmiα ¼ 1g
the set of neighbours of the non-veriﬁed user α∈ Γ in the
bipartite network of veriﬁed/unveriﬁed users, i.e., the set of
veriﬁed users node α has interacted with. The polarisation index
for α is
ρα ¼ maxðfIα;c : c ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4gÞ for α 2 Γ ð1Þ
with
Iα;c ¼
jCc \ N αj
jN αj
for c ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4: ð2Þ
The term Iα;c denotes the fraction of α’s interactions towards
community c, i.e., the ratio of α’s neighbours belonging to
community c. This index has the following characteristics: is
bounded in [0, 1], therefore ρα= 0 means that no interaction has
been observed with the four groups; values of ρα close to 1/4
indicate that user α equally interacts with the four clusters; for all
the other values, the greater ρα the higher the inequality in the
number of interactions with the four communities (i.e., ρα close to
1 means that user α almost always has interacted with the same
group). The choice of this index has been mostly driven by the
observation of users’ interactions with the communities. See left
panel of Fig. 2: each square in the heatmap reproduces the
average value of the quantity on the x-axis, computed over the set
of non-veriﬁed users belonging to the community on the y-axis.
This result indicates that most of the non-veriﬁed users have an
extremely unbalanced distribution of their interactions with the
members of the other alliances, since they mostly retweet content
shared by people from their own community rather than from
different ones. However, the deﬁnition of this polarisation index
is independent on the number of interactions: two different users
that, respectively, interact (for instance) one time or ten times
towards the same community will be assigned the same value of
polarisation. In order to take this situation into account, we show
in Fig. 3 the distribution of the polarisation indices conditional on
the total number of interactions observed for each user. In this
case, the distributions are also concentrated towards higher values
of the index. Moreover, for lower numbers of interactions, we also
observe users that interact with people not belonging to the
identiﬁed groups (this situation corresponds to the case of
polarisation equal to zero). However, this behaviour disappears
for higher numbers of interactions, meaning that more active
users interact with the identiﬁed communities only, which
translates into higher polarisation indices. Instead, the right-
hand side of Fig. 2 represents the histogram of the polarisation
values obtained for the non-veriﬁed users. As introduced by a
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Table 1 First most central veriﬁed users: list of the most central users in the validated network of veriﬁed users
The coloured dot left to the name indicates the political afﬁliation of the user according to our division in community
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preliminary evaluation of users’ behaviour, many non-veriﬁed
users show high polarisation values, meaning that their attention
patterns are mostly focused towards a limited group of political
actors.
Figure 4 shows the biadjacency matrix of the bipartite network
of veriﬁed and non-veriﬁed users. The coloured blocks identify
the four communities obtained with the community detection
method: the red and blue blocks, respectively, identify the groups
of left-leaning and right-leaning politicians; the yellow commu-
nity collects the available political ﬁgures within the M5S party,
while the violet group represents the information channels
community. The rows of the matrix have been ordered according
to the division in communities of the veriﬁed users, while the
non-veriﬁed users have been sorted according to their political
afﬁliation, i.e., the number of interactions towards each group,
that is equivalent to the computation of the numerator of the
term in Eq. (2) for all the available communities. Such a matrix
exhibits a block structure along the diagonal, indicating a greater
number of interactions towards the “preferred” community with
respect to the others and therefore a higher density of links within
the blocks with respect to the external density.
Once the non-veriﬁed users have been classiﬁed in political
alliances based on their polarisation values, we perform again an
analysis of the most used hashtags in each group. The result is
Fig. 1 Hashtags used by the four network communities
Fig. 2 Users’ interactions
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shown in Fig. 1 of the Supplementary Material ﬁle. In this case the
result is interesting: the analysis of the hashtags used more
frequently by all users in each coalition (veriﬁed and non-veriﬁed)
reveals that the tag with the highest frequency is related to the
opponent group, as if the membership to a certain community
could also be driven by the dislike of the opponent group rather
than by the approval of the proposal of one’s network-based
alliance only.
At this point, we think it is worth performing a more in-depth
analysis of the concept of polarisation. Broadly speaking, the
concept of polarisation in social sciences refers to a division of the
society under analysis in several divided groups, characterised by
different beliefs or opinion. Instead, the formation of echo
chambers can be seen as a consequence of a polarised society:
because of the fact that people only interact with other members
of their same social group, news and beliefs are reinforced and
ampliﬁed since they reverberate within the same closed social
sphere. Therefore, we consider the results of our analysis more
related to the phenomenon of polarisation: given our deﬁnition, a
high value of this index indicates that an user systematically
interacts with (i.e., retweets content shared by) people belonging
to her/his same coalition rather than with users from different
alliances, but we disregard any information concerning the
content of the shared news and we do not take into account how
it is ampliﬁed by being shared within the same group of people.
Finally, we think it is worth noting that, contrarily to the
majority of studies on the same subject, the polarisation of non-
certiﬁed users has not been studied simply labelling the units in
the veriﬁed accounts layer. On the contrary, users in the same
community share a signiﬁcantly high number of non-veriﬁed
users that have retweeted their content. Indeed, a validated edge
between users i and j indicates that a high number of non-veriﬁed
accounts who shared contents posted by i has also retweeted posts
published by j and therefore they are considered similar by a
majority of their audience and followers. Therefore, in our
analysis, the driver to understand the division in clusters is solely
the behaviour of non-certiﬁed accounts.
Inﬂuence analysis. At this point, we proceed with the identiﬁ-
cation of the signiﬁcant sources of Twitter viral content. Inspired
by the work of (Bovet and Makse, 2018), we propose a bipartite
and directed network of information ﬂow. An example of this kind
of graph is provided in Fig. 5. The users on the upper layer tweet
and retweet the posts represented on the lower layer. An out-
going edge (i, p) as in the ﬁgure indicates that user i has published
tweet p during the considered time period, while a link in the
opposite direction (p, j) denotes that user j has retweeted the same
post p. In this situation, j behaves as a spreader: the larger the
number of spreaders of an user, the larger the audience of the
contents shared by her/him. Moreover, the larger the number of
tweets posted by i that have been retweeted by j, the tighter the
social bond between the two.
As in (Bovet and Makse, 2018), we simply project the bipartite
and directed network of tweets and retweets onto the users layer:
a directed edge between i and j in the projected graph indicates
that j has retweeted i’s posts at least one time. A list of the nodes
with the highest out-degrees per community can be found in
Table 2. The ✓ next to the name indicates veriﬁed users. Clearly
the top 20 most-retweeted users in each group are mainly
certiﬁed, because they are extremely active with the purpose of
enlarging their pool of voters. From the same graph we also select
the top 20 nodes with the highest in-degrees, i.e., the spreaders,
who have a high number of retweets. In this case, the most
retweeting users are mostly uncertiﬁed. Moreover, we also detect
some of the involved accounts that have been suspended,
suggesting the presence of accounts violating the Twitter policy
Fig. 3 Users’ polarisation
Fig. 4 Biadjacency matrix showing the communities of users
Fig. 5 Bipartite and directed representation of the network of retweets
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Table 2 Most retweeted users: Following the approach of (Bovet and Makse, 2018), we build the monopartite and directed
network of retweets, in which an edge (i, j) indicates that j has retweeted i at least once
Then we select the directed subgraph generated by each community and here we report the list of the most retweeted users within each subgraph. The ✓ next to the name indicates that the account has
been veriﬁed
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during the event of the elections: there is one suspended account
in the M5S coalition and two others in the right-leaning one.
However, these ﬁndings are not really explanatory in
identifying the most effective users in the directed network of
retweets, since we are missing a benchmark for stating if j is a
signiﬁcant contributor of the popularity of i’s posts. The
identiﬁcation of such signiﬁcant tights will be performed in two
steps: ﬁrst, we deﬁne a suitable benchmark model to evaluate the
signiﬁcance of pairwise connections; this can be done by using the
Bipartite Directed Conﬁguration Model proposed in the Appen-
dix of (de Jeude et al., 2018), thus discounting the information
related to the in- and out-degrees of nodes belonging to both
layers (in the present case the information of in- and out-degrees
of posts and users). Then we extend the validation presented in
(Saracco et al., 2017) to this kind of graphs, in order to identify
the signiﬁcant tights between source and spreader and validate
the directed network of information ﬂow. The entire procedure is
explained in Section ‘Methods’, but additional details of the
method are presented in the Supplementary Material ﬁle. In the
ﬁnal validated and directed network of users, only the pairs of
users in which one of the two retweets the other’s contents more
than what is expected by the considered null model will be
connected. A pictorial representation of the network of validated
retweets is provided in Fig. 6.
Nodes’ colour identiﬁes the user’s community while nodes’
dimension is proportional to their out-degree in the validated
graph, i.e., the number of signiﬁcant spreaders they have. The
structure of this network is better represented in Figs 7–10. Each
plot focuses on the structure of the subgraphs of the directed
network generated by each community. Nodes’ dimension is
again directly proportional to their out-degrees in the subgraph:
the larger the node, the higher the number of times that user has
been retweeted by the other accounts. Nodes’ colour is instead
related to whether the account has been veriﬁed or not: blue for
veriﬁed users, orange for non-veriﬁed ones.
The ﬁrst plot (Fig. 7) is related to the M5S community and
shows a strongly connected block of (mostly non-veriﬁed) nodes
that retweet among themselves and with the veriﬁed accounts of
the community, the most central of which are the Twitter
accounts of the newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano and its journalists
Marco Travaglio, Peter Gomez and Antonio Padellaro. In the
other communities journalists and newspapers do not form such
a strong core. It is interesting to note that the M5S political leader
Luigi Di Maio does not belong to this central community but is
located in a small community outside this large component.
The second plot represents the purple community (see Fig. 8).
The most central nodes are the veriﬁed accounts of newspapers
(see for example La Repubblica or Il Corriere della Sera) and
information channels (such as Sky TG24, Tg La7, Agenzia Ansa
or Rainews). Some politicians such as Pietro Grasso or Giuseppe
Civati are present in this group, together with the political parties
of Rifondazione and an extreme-left party (which account is not
veriﬁed). These politicians represent the most extreme, left-
leaning orientation who have not encountered a commonality of
Fig. 6 Validated and directed network of retweets
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interests and supporters with the accounts in the community of
Partito Democratico and therefore they belong to different
communities.
In the plot associated to the left-leaning community (see Fig. 9)
we identify a central block of mostly non-veriﬁed users. The most
retweeted ﬁgures are Matteo Renzi and the account of Partito
Democratico, as shown by their high values of out-degrees. The
remaining veriﬁed nodes are mostly well-known characters in the
political scenario (such as Maria Elena Boschi and Carlo
Calenda), as well as newspapers (see for example Il Foglio or
IlSole24Ore). Among the non-veriﬁed users we have the accounts
of the Partito Democratico political parties related to the areas of
Milan and Rome.
Finally, the plot associated to the right-leaning community (see
Fig. 10) is characterised by two quite separate clusters; one of
them is centred on the accounts of people belonging to Lega
Nord, such as Matteo Salvini, Claudio Borghi and the party Lega-
Salvini Premier. On the other side there are the accounts of Forza
Italia and Gruppo FI Camera and some of its exponents like Silvio
Berlusconi or Renato Brunetta. The two veriﬁed nodes of Giorgia
Meloni and Fratelli d’Italia (the political party she is leading)
receive retweets from both sides, nevertheless being closer to the
Lega pole. Another popular node is a neo-nazi party (which
account is not veriﬁed), that has its own circle of retweeters and
share some interactions with the subgroup of Lega Nord.
In order to understand how viral news propagate through the
validated network, we analyse the percentage of retweets coming
from inside of the same community and the percentage that,
instead, derives from the other ones. The results are shown in
Fig. 2 of the Supplementary Materials and are extensively
commented therein.
Methods
Deﬁnition of the polarisation network
Bipartite network of veriﬁed/unveriﬁed users. As a ﬁrst step, we
have split the sample of available and Italian-speaking users in
two categories, the groups of veriﬁed and non-veriﬁed users. Each
account can request to be veriﬁed by the system: by doing so,
Twitter guarantees that the account is authentic. This kind of
procedure is, in general, applied to all those people who are
considered of public interest. Therefore, we expect the accounts of
famous people, politicians, newspapers, TV channels, radio
channels etc. to be included into the set of veriﬁed users, while all
the remaining users to belong to the other set.
We do not have speciﬁc information regarding the type of
accounts that use Twitter daily and which of them may ask to be
veriﬁed. However, we know from (AGCOM, 2018) that social
networks are increasingly used in Italy with the purpose of
retrieving information. In particular, the report shows that there
is a difference in the type of social networks used by citizens
against the ones consulted by professionals: on-line social
networks such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat are used by all
people, professionals, as well as common users, while others such
as Twitter or LinkedIn are more popular among business people
(the report refers to journalists). Indeed, journalists retrieve
Fig. 7 Directed subgraph for community C1
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information on Twitter, share their own and fellows’ articles and
it is also a way to keep an eye on users’ discussion on a speciﬁc
topic. Therefore, we may expect to ﬁnd professionals such as
politicians, newspapers, information channels like TV or radios to
belong to the set of veriﬁed accounts.
Given this division, we construct a ﬁrst bipartite network from
the data, the network of retweets between veriﬁed and non-veriﬁed
users during the whole period, denoted as GBi ¼ ðL; Γ; EÞ2. By
deﬁnition of bipartite networks, with this representation we
exclude all the cases in which two certiﬁed (or non-certiﬁed) users
retweet each other. We do so since we are interested in exploiting
the way normal people consume the news to detect connected
groups of certiﬁed users. Refer to Section 4.1.1 of the Supplemen-
tary Materials for a more detailed description of this network.
Bipartite conﬁguration model and undirected validated projection.
In order to evaluate the relevance of the bipartite network of
retweets between veriﬁed and non-veriﬁed users, we need to
deﬁne a suitable model as a benchmark for our measurements.
Indeed, at the present step we want to discount the information
due to the activity of the users, both veriﬁed and unveriﬁed, in
order to detect non-trivial superposition of connections. Thus, we
implement a Bipartite Conﬁguration Model (BiCM) (Saracco
et al., 2015) for this case, that maximises the entropy of the
system, constraining the degree sequence of the two layers. A full
detailed description of the null model can be found in the Sup-
plementary Materials. Let us just remind here that at the end of
this procedure we obtain a probability per graph that factorises in
independent probabilities per link.
In order to infer information about similar behaviours of
veriﬁed users, we ﬁrst project the information contained in the
bipartite network GBi on the veriﬁed-users layer. The result of the
classical projection methods is a weighted monopartite network:
two users i, j∈ L are connected if they share at least one common
neighbour on the opposite layer Γ and the edge between them is
weighted by the number of non-veriﬁed users who have
simultaneously retweeted their posts. This quantity is expressed
by the number of V–motifs between users i and j (Diestel, 2012;
Saracco et al., 2015)
Vij ¼
X
α2Γ
miαm

jα:
However, this method often generates a highly connected
projection; in order to extract the statistically signiﬁcant
information of this projection we implement the method of
(Saracco et al., 2017). Roughly speaking, the method consists in
comparing the realised V–motifs with the expected value of the
Bipartite Conﬁguration Model. In this sense, the statically
signiﬁcant V–motifs are extracted: otherwise stated, all motifs
that cannot be explained by the degree sequence only are
validated. More details can be found in the Supplementary
Materials, Sections 4.1.2–4.1.3.
Directed network of information ﬂow
Bipartite directed network of tweeting/retweeting activity. In this
section, we describe the construction of the bipartite and directed
network of information ﬂow. A directed edge (i, p) indicates that
user i is the original creator of post p, while an edge on the
Fig. 8 Directed subgraph for community C2
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opposite direction (p, j) shows that j has retweeted tweet p at least
one time during the elections days. Such a situation is shown in
the left panel of Fig. 5. In the picture, i is an user who publishes
two posts p and q during the election days; user j retweets post p
and user k retweets post q. Notice that, by construction, we
cannot keep track of chains of sequential retweets (consult Sec-
tion 1 of the Supplementary Materials for additional details about
the nature of the data set). Therefore, the edge (q, k) does not
necessarily mean that k has retweeted directly from i’s post: it is
possible (though less likely) that k has retweeted post q from one
of user i’s retweets. Another particular case is self-retweet: Twitter
allows users to retweet their own posts, either directly from the
original tweet or from somebody else’s retweet. With this network
representation, these cases can be illustrated as in right panel of
Fig. 5, where the retweet by i itself is indicated with the red arrow.
However, these type of edges have been excluded from the ana-
lysis, since they represent a very small percentage of the overall
number of retweets observed in the data and we are rather
interested in how people from the same political coalition interact
with each other to boost the visibility of their opinion.
This bipartite and directed network GBiD can be represented by
means of two biadjacency matrices, one for the tweets T ¼ ftip :
i 2 U and p 2 Pg and the other one for the retweets
R ¼ frpj : p 2 P and j 2 Ug. Essentially tip ¼ 1 if user i has
tweeted post p and 0 otherwise and rpj ¼ 1 whether at least one
retweet to post p by user j is observed during the observation
period. Refer to Section 4.2 for a more detailed description of this
directed network.
Bipartite directed conﬁguration model and directed validated
projection. For the present analysis we are interested in identi-
fying the most pervasive tweet ﬂows, discounting both the users’
activity and the tweets’ virality. Otherwise stated, the goal is to
measure which are the non-trivial patterns observed in the net-
work, not explained by the degree sequence of both layers, to
highlight and describe the structure of the system. The rando-
misation procedure for a bipartite directed network, imposing
constraints on the in-degree and out-degree sequences, was ﬁrst
presented in the Appendix of (de Jeude et al., 2018); we revise the
procedure that leads to the deﬁnition of the probabilities in the
Supplementary Materials. Let us remark that, as in the previous
(undirected) case of the BiCM, the probability per graph fac-
torises in terms of probabilities per (directed) link. Moreover,
with respect to the previous case, there is a crucial simpliﬁcation:
each post cannot have more than an author, thus the in-degree of
tweets over the ensemble deﬁned by Bipartite Directed Conﬁg-
uration Model (BiDCM) is simply hκinp i ¼ 1.
Extending the deﬁnition of V–motifs to directed networks, the
quantity V ij identiﬁes the number of times j has acted as a
spreader for i, retweeting content posted by her/him3. Using the
null model’s expected value of this quantity we are able to infer
the statistical signiﬁcance of the tight between i and j, following a
procedure similar to the one of (Saracco et al., 2017); consult the
Supplementary Materials for further details. This procedure
returns a squared NU ×NU matrix collecting the signiﬁcance of
each link and each edge is treated as a separate null hypothesis to
test4. Only the links associated to rejected hypotheses have to be
Fig. 9 Directed subgraph for community C3
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included in the validated network: whenever Vij is statistically
validated, j is considered a signiﬁcant spreader of i’s tweets and
the directed edge (i, j) is included in the validated network of
information ﬂows F= (fij)ij∈U. Refer to Sections 4.3–4.4 for a
more detailed description of these methods.
Discussion
In this work, we focused our attention on two main research
goals: the detection of potential political alliances starting from
the observation of the on-line behaviour and the identiﬁcation of
the sources of Twitter viral content from the tweeting and
retweeting activity. We have addressed these tasks on the on-line
social network built during the last Italian electoral campaign of
2018, gathering the data from the Twitter API during the month
before the elections (held on March 4, 2018).
As a ﬁrst step, we exploited the way people consume news on
the social media to identify four groups of strongly connected
veriﬁed users: two certiﬁed users are connected in the validated
network of retweets if a signiﬁcantly high number of non-certiﬁed
accounts retweets content published by both of them. By con-
struction, the behaviour of non-certiﬁed users is exploited to
understand the division of the political sphere into clusters. An
analysis of the obtained communities shows that the most central
accounts are mostly newspapers, journalists and information
channels in general, each of them belonging to one of the pre-
viously listed clusters. Looking at the hashtags included in the
posts published by the veriﬁed users in each group, we see that
the most used keywords are referred to the party itself and its
members, followed by keywords related to political competitors.
However, when also non-veriﬁed users are included in the ana-
lysis, the behaviour changes and the most popular keyword
becomes the name of the major competitor. Given the obtained
division in political alliances, we studied the behaviour of the
remaining non-veriﬁed users towards these groups. More speci-
ﬁcally, we have observed the fraction of retweets directed towards
each alliance: we observe a strongly polarised behaviour, since the
majority of the uncertiﬁed accounts in the bipartite network of
retweets mostly interact with one community only. In order to
strengthen this result, we also perform a different analysis com-
paring the distribution of polarisation values observed for users
with the same number of interactions. Also in this case, the
distribution is skewed towards the higher numbers, indicating a
focus towards the same group of users.
As a second step, we focused our attention on the identiﬁcation
of signiﬁcant news spreaders. Following the methodology presented
in (Bovet and Makse, 2018), we constructed the directed network of
retweets among users and selected the names with the highest out-
degree and in-degree. In order to statistically validate our ﬁndings,
we constructed the bipartite and directed network of tweets and
retweets introduced in Sections ‘Bipartite directed network of
tweeting/retweeting activity’, ‘Bipartite Directed Conﬁguration
Model and directed validated projection’ and performed the vali-
dation procedure described therein. The outcome of this analysis is
a monopartite, directed network of users, in which an edge from i to
j indicates that the latter retweeted contents posted by the former a
Fig. 10 Directed subgraph for community C4
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signiﬁcantly high number of times. The visualisation of this vali-
dated network helps to understand the actual composition of each
coalition, as well as the possible interconnections between them.
For instance, we observed that part of the connections between
one community and another one happens between veriﬁed and
unveriﬁed users, where, in most of the cases, the latter retweeted
some posts from the former. However, we also see connections
involving newspapers and information channels belonging to
different coalitions, conﬁrming again their essential role and
centrality in spreading news on the social networks. Finally, we
analysed the origin of the retweets received by each community:
even though the distribution seems less polarised in this case, a
higher percentage of the retweets received by a community comes
from users belonging to the community itself, especially for the
cases of C3 and C4, showing that most of the interactions still
comes from the same sphere of inﬂuence (see Figs 2 and 3 of the
Supplementary Material).
In our view, the methodological contributions of this paper are
manifold. First, at odds with a majority of papers dealing with the
same topic, our dataset was not manually labelled: we identiﬁed
groups of strongly connected users starting from the behaviour of
non-certiﬁed ones and their interactions with certiﬁed people.
Despite this data-driven approach, we manage to identify four
clusters of users that are closely aligned with the known Italian
political division. Therefore, how people consume the news and
interact with the main political ﬁgures helps to shed light on the
actual division of the veriﬁed users according to their political
orientation. Our second contribution resides in the representation
of the network of activities on Twitter as a bipartite, directed
network. We employed the null model for directed bipartite
networks proposed in the Appendix of (de Jeude et al., 2018) to
identify the signiﬁcant information ﬂows between pairs of users
and different communities. We observe that the right-leaning
alliance is divided in two subcommunities: one centred on Ber-
lusconi and Forza Italia, closer to the Partito Democratico com-
munity; the other, led by Salvini and Lega party, closer to the M5S
community. The result is striking since M5S and Lega actually
allied to form a new government, after the elections, when no
predeﬁned alliance obtained the absolute majority. Again, a
reminder might be worth concerning the fact that our results are
obtained from the analysis of a sample of tweets. Therefore, given
the issues related to Twitter Search API, the outcomes of the
analysis might be affected by the employed sampling procedure.
An important problem in the analysis of complex systems is the
detection of relevant signals with respect to the random noise, that
typically affects the interactions among a huge amount of different
agents. In this sense, in order to ﬁlter such a contribution from the
real system, several approaches have been proposed. The variety of
these proposals resides in the nature of the random noise and in
how such component should be discounted. In our work, this kind
of analysis allows to see that signals of the political alliances estab-
lished after the elections were already present in the on-line sphere
before the elections and could be detected when observing the way
people consume the news on Twitter. Interesting lines of research,
left for future investigations, include a validation of our approach to
a corpus of different elections, in order to identify potential reg-
ularities or differences between countries, and the use of tools from
natural language processing to infer how positively connoted and
negatively connoted tweets are distributed across the communities.
Data availability
The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are
not publicly available due to the data cleaning procedure the
authors implement for research purposes, but are available from
the corresponding author on reasonable request.
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Notes
1 Nodes play the role of the volume in the canonical deﬁnition in statistical physics.
2 In the following we will refer to quantities regarding the real network with an asterisk *.
3 Note that V ij≠V ji:
4 Actually, there is a tricky part. Since all users that were not author of retweeted posts have
probability exactly equal to zero to spread a tweet, their probability to be the source of a
directed V− motif is again exactly zero, for each of the possible tweet. Those cases were
not considered in the FDR.
References
Adamic LA, Glance N (2005) The political blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. election.
In: Proc. 3rd International Work Link Discovery-LinkKDD ’05. ACM Press,
New York, p 36–43
AGCOM (2018) Report on the news consumption. Technical Report. https://www.
agcom.it/documents/10179/10214149/Studio-Ricerca+10-04-2018/
4619854b-6d9b-491b-a3c8-f7444487006d?version=1.0
Badawy A, Ferrara E, Lerman K (2018) Analyzing the Digital Traces of Political
Manipulation: The 2016 Russian Interference Twitter Campaign. https://doi.
org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn. http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.04291
Bakshy E, Messing S, Adamic LA (2015) Exposure to ideologically diverse news
and opinion on Facebook. Science 348(6239):1130–1132. https://doi.org/
10.1126/science.aaa1160
Barabási A-L (2011) The network takeover. Nat Phys 8:14–16. https://doi.org/
10.1038/nphys2188
Becatti C, Caldarelli G, Saracco F (2019) Entropy-based randomization of rating
networks. Phys Rev E 99(2):022306
Bekaﬁgo MA, McBride A (2013) Who Tweets About Politics?: Political Partici-
pation of Twitter Users During the 2011Gubernatorial Elections. Soc Sci
Comput Rev 31(5):625–643. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313490405
Berelson BR, Lazarsfeld PF, McPhee WN (1954) Voting: a study of opinion for-
mation in a presidential campaign, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Bindi J, Colombi D, Iannelli F, Politi N, Sugarelli M, Tavarone R, Ubaldi E (2018)
Political Discussion and Leanings on Twitter: the 2016 Italian Constitutional
Referendum. http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.07388
Blondel VD, Guillaume JL, Lambiotte R, Lefebvre E (2008) Fast unfolding of
communities in large networks. J. Stat. Mech. Theory Exp. 2008(10). https://
doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/2008/10/P10008
Borondo J, Morales AJ, Losada JC, Benito RM (2012) Characterizing and modeling
an electoral campaign in the context of Twitter: 2011 Spanish Presidential
election as a case study. Chaos 22(2):023138. https://doi.org/10.1063/
1.4729139
Bovet A, Makse HA (2018) Inﬂuence of fake news in Twitter during the 2016 US
presidential election. Nat Commun 10(1):7. http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.08491
Bovet A, Morone F, Makse HA (2018) Validation of Twitter opinion trends with
national polling aggregates: Hillary Clinton vs Donald Trump. Sci Rep 8
(1):8673. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-26951-y
Boyd D, Crawford K (2012) Critical questions for big data: provocations for a cultural,
technological, and scholarly phenomenon. Inf, Commun Soc 15(5):662–679
Bruns A, Stieglitz S (2012) Quantitative approaches to comparing communication
patterns on twitter. J Technol Hum Serv 30(3–4):160–185. https://doi.org/
10.1080/15228835.2012.744249
Caldarelli G (2010) Scale-Free Networks: Complex Webs in Nature and Tech-
nology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Caldarelli G, Chessa A, Pammolli F, Pompa G, Puliga M, Riccaboni M, Riotta G
(2014) A multi-level geographical study of italian political elections from twitter
data. PLoS ONE 9(5):e95809. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0095809
CiminiG, Squartini T, Saracco F, Garlaschelli D, Gabrielli A, Caldarelli G(2018)
The Statistical Physics of Real-World Networks Nat Rev Phys 1(1):58. http://
arxiv.org/abs/1810.05095
Conover M, Ratkiewicz J, Francisco M (2011) Political polarization on twitter.
Icwsm. https://doi.org/10.1021/ja202932e
Cram L, Llewellyn C, Hill R, Magdy W (2017) UK General Election 2017: a Twitter
Analysis. Neuropolitics Res Lab 2017:1–11. http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.02271
Dandekar P, Goel A, Lee D (2012) Biased Assimilation, Homophily and the
Dynamics of Polarization. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 110(15):5791–5796.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1217220110
de Jeude J. v. L., Di Clemente R, Caldarelli G, Saracco F, Squartini T (2018)
Reconstructing mesoscale network structures. https://doi.org/10.1242/jeb.01477
Del Vicario M, Bessi A, Zollo F, Petroni F, Scala A, Caldarelli G, Stanley HE, Quat-
trociocchi W (2016a) The spreading of misinformation online. Proc Natl Acad
Sci 113(3):554–559. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1517441113. ISSN 0027-8424
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0300-3
14 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |            (2019) 5:91 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0300-3 | www.nature.com/palcomms
Del Vicario M, Vivaldo G, Bessi A, Zollo F, Scala A, Caldarelli G, Quattrociocchi W
(2016b) Echo Chambers: Emotional Contagion and Group Polarization on
Facebook. Sci Rep 6:37825. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep37825. ISSN 20452322
Del Vicario M, Gaito S, Quattrociocchi W, Zignani M, Zollo F (2017a) Public
discourse and news consumption on online social media: a quantitative,
cross-platform analysis of the Italian Referendum 10.475/123. http://arxiv.
org/abs/1702.06016
Del Vicario M, Zollo F, Caldarelli G, Scala A, Quattrociocchi W (2017b) Mapping
social dynamics on Facebook: The Brexit debate. Soc Netw 5:6–16. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2017.02.002
Di Fonzo N (2011) The echo-chamber effect. https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2011/04/21/barack-obama-and-the-psychology-of-the-
birther-myth/the-echo-chamber-effect
Di Gangi D, Lillo F, Pirino D (2018) Assessing systemic risk due to ﬁre sales
spillover through maximum entropy network reconstruction. J Econ Dyn
Control 94:117–141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.07.001
Diakopoulos NA, Shamma DA (2010) Characterizing debate performance via aggre-
gated twitter sentiment. In: Proceedings of 28th 28th International Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems. CHI ’10. ACM Press, New York
Diestel R (2012) Graph theory, 4th edn. https://doi.org/10.1109/IEMBS.2010.5626521
DiGrazia J, McKelvey K, Bollen J, Rojas F (2013) More tweets, more votes: social
media as a quantitative indicator of political behavior. PLoS ONE 8(11):
e79449. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0079449
Driscoll K, Walker S (2014) Big data, big questions| working within a black box:
transparency in the collection and production of big twitter data. Int J
Commun 8:20
Enli GS, Skogerbø E (2013) Personalized campaigns in party-centered politics:
Twitter and Facebook as arenas for political communication. Inf Commun
Soc 16(5):757–774. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2013.782330
Ferrara E (2017) Disinformation and social bot operations in the run up to the 2017
French presidential election. First Monday. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2995809
Ferrara E, Yang Z (2015) Quantifying the effect of sentiment on information diffusion
in social media. PeerJ Comput Sci 1:e26. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.26
Flaxman S, Goel S, Rao JM (2013) Ideological segregation and the effects of social
media on news consumption. SSRN Electron J 1–39. https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2363701
Fortunato S (2010) Community detection in graphs. Phys Rep 486(3–5):75–174.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physrep.2009.11.002
Fronczak P, Fronczak A, Bujok M (2013) Exponential Random Graph Models for
Networks with Community Structure. Phys Rev E 88(May):032810. https://
doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.88.032810
Garlaschelli D, Loffredo MI (2008) Maximum likelihood: Extracting unbiased
information from complex networks. Phys Rev E - Stat Nonlinear, Soft
Matter Phys 78(1):1–5. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.78.015101
Gibson RK, McAllister I (2006) Does Cyber-Campaigning Win Votes? Online
Communication in the 2004 Australian Election. J Élect, Public Opin Parties
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